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I. INTRODUCTION
In a classic episode of "The Simpsons," chronically
insensitive husband Homer Simpson presents his wife Marge with
the gift of a bowling ball on her thirty-fourth birthday.' Marge, to
put it mildly, does not appreciate the gift, and marital strife ensues.
Why? On its face, the presentation of a bowling ball would not
seem like an objectionable act. Lots of people like bowling; lots of
people appreciate bowling balls as gifts. Perhaps Marge is merely
high-maintenance, or unreasonably difficult to please. However,
the reasons for her anger quickly become clear as events progress.
As it turns out, Marge does not know how to bowl but coincidentally, Homer loves bowling. In addition, the bowling ball in
question just so happens to have been engraved with Homer's
name and drilled to fit his fingers. Thus, the facts of the episode
reveal that Marge Simpson has two perfectly legitimate reasons to
object to the gift. First, it is clearly given from a position of selfinterest, not altruism. Homer wants the bowling ball for himself,
and has barely tried to hide his true motivation. Second, Homer's
self-interested motivation in choosing Marge's birthday present
has resulted in his presenting her with an inappropriate gift that
clearly does not serve her needs.2
The current state of the relationship between large-firm pro
bono programs and the public interest agencies with whom they
partner calls to mind the "gift" of Marge's bowling ball. Firms'
pro bono programs, although superficially designed to appear
altruistically motivated, are often actually structured to serve
bottom-line interests, such as associate recruitment, training and
retention, and public relations. Where firms' decisions about pro
bono are filtered through a lens of "bottom-line" motivations, the
relationship between large firms and their public interest partners
can become problematic for the public interest agencies. Pro bono
1 The Simpsons: Life on the Fast Lane (FOX television broadcast Mar. 18,

1990).
Lest the reader think me (and Marge) unfairly suspicious of Homer's
motivations, let me note that, prior to the bowling-ball incident, he had also
presented Marge with the gifts of a tackle box and a Connie Chung calendar. Id.
2
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coordinators pick and choose "sexy" cases or "easy" cases over
cases that address the most acute needs of the target population;
associates are pulled away from pro bono projects when paying
work begins to pile up; public interest agencies invest significant
time training and mentoring young associates in pro bono
programs with little payback to the agency. Even the bestresourced, most elite national public interest groups report
difficulties dealing with pro bono programs. In many ways, both
subtle and obvious, bottom-line-motivated pro bono programs are
to a public interest agency what a bowling ball is to Marge
Simpson: the wrong gift, given for the wrong reason.
This Article examines the ways in which the bottom-line
motivations of pro bono programs affect public interest agencies
and attorneys. It then seeks to explore the question of how public
interest agencies ought to cope with pro bono participation with
partners whose bottom-line motivations threaten to damage the
public interest agency.
Part II of this Article seeks to lay the groundwork for
exploration of this topic by arriving at operating definitions of the
terms "pro bono" and "public interest"-a more difficult endeavor
than one might imagine.
Part III explores how the legal
profession's conception of the definition and role of "pro bono"
work has evolved, from the simple concept of providing services
for free to those who cannot afford it, to a formalized institution
that is inextricably linked to the public interest bar and that while
still providing legal services for free-has been re-imagined to
serve bottom-line motivations of large law firms. Part IV offers
different ways in which the pro bono programs' bottom-line
motivations have a detrimental effect on public interest agencies.
Specifically, this Article suggests that bottom-line-motivated pro
bono programs harm public interest partners by interfering with
triage decisions, proliferating case management problems, and
creating a drag on the efficiency of public interest agencies. As the
former legal director of a small nonprofit, I offer anecdotes from
my own practice that demonstrate these problems and further offer
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an example of a new type of pro bono initiative that fits the bill of
"bottom-line motivated." 3 Part V suggests two specific coping
mechanisms public interest agencies could employ to offset the
negative effects bottom-line-motivated pro bono programs have on
agencies with whom they work.
II.

DEFINING TERMS: "PRO BONO" AND
"PUBLIC INTEREST"

Before exploring these issues in greater depth, two key
terms, "pro bono" and "public interest," require clarification.
Within the legal community, the casual meaning of "pro bono" is
any legal service that an attorney renders for free to the client when
the service is normally one for which that attorney would charge a
fee. 4 Thus, the term "pro bono" generally excludes free legal
services provided by an attorney through employment at a
nonprofit or government entity, such as a Legal Aid attorney or
public defender. Those attorneys are generally not thought of as
providing "pro bono" services because the attorney would not
normally charge for the service.
And yet, this is a deceptively simple definition, for in
reality, the catch-all term "pro bono" masks a deep well of
disagreement within the legal community as to what kind of work
"counts" as pro bono and what does not. Should, for example,
legal services performed without charge for the benefit of a
comparatively wealthy nonprofit (such as a museum or orchestra)
be considered pro bono?5 Must a broader social goal underlie the

These anecdotes are meant only to be illustrative, and are not presented to the
reader as data, or as proof that the problems I describe are endemic-although I
personally believe them to be quite commonly experienced by public interest
attorneys.
4 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) ("pro bono" "being or
involving uncompensated legal services performed especially for the public
good.").
5 See, e.g., Spencer Rand, A Poverty of Representation: The Attorney's Role to
Advocate for the Powerless, 13 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 545, 556 (2007)
(relating an interchange with an attorney who considered his assistance in
3
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provision of the service? If so, must that goal necessarily be a
classically "progressive" one (the uplift of a particular underclass,
for example, or the eradication of poverty), or may the goal be
politically conservative (for example, the promotion of explicitly
religious teaching in public schools)? 6
Taking into consideration the vagueness of the term, this
Article will adopt the definition of "pro bono" that the large firms
themselves are encouraged to adopt by the Pro Bono Institute's Pro
Bono Challenge program.7 The Challenge's definition, which is
very broad and encompasses practically any possible activity that a
lawyer might envision as "pro bono," is as follows:
As used in this statement, the term "pro bono"
refers to activities of the firm undertaken nornally
without expectation of fee and not in the course of
ordinary commercial practice and consisting of (i)
the delivery of legal services to persons of limited
means or to charitable, religious, civic, community,
governmental

and

educational

organizations

in

matters which are designed primarily to address the
needs of persons of limited means: (ii) the provision
of legal assistance to individuals, groups, or
incorporating a children's athletic league in a wealthy suburb to be within the
definition of pro bono).
6 See, e.g., AUSTIN SARAT & STUART A. SCHEINGOLD,, SOMETHING
TO BELIEVE
IN: POLITICS, PROFESSIONALISM, AND CAUSE LAWYERING 3, 100-01 (2004).
7 The Pro Bono Institute is a small non-profit organization housed at the
Georgetown University Law Center that seeks to find innovative ways to
expand access to justice. It houses a Law Firm Pro Bono Project, the
purpose of which is to expand pro bono participation at major law firms.
The Law Firm Pro Bono Project in turn administers the Pro Bono
Challenge Program, a series of "aspirational goals uniquely tailored to the
resources and practice of major law firms." The Pro Bono Institute, Law
Firm
Pro
Bono
Project,
PRO
BONO
INSTITUTE,
http://www.probonoinst.org/projects/law-firm-pro-bono.html (last visited Mar.
7,2011).
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organizations seeking to secure or protect civil
rights, civil liberties or public rights; and (iii) the
provision of legal assistance to charitable, religious,
civic, community, govennental or educational
organizations in matters in furtherance of their
organizational purposes, where the payment of
standard legal fees would significantly deplete the
organization's economic resources or would be
otherwise inappropriate. 8
Although this definition is comprehensive regarding the
type of work that ought to "count" as pro bono, it does not fully
address the complex and multifaceted ways in which pro bono
cases arrive at firms, nor does it describe the relationships between
firms and public interest partners. Firms may obtain pro bono
cases through a variety of sources. Some may create ongoing
relationships with public interest agencies that engage in a kind of
work that interests the firm. 9 Others prefer to receive cases from a
free-standing pro bono referral agency, 10 the referral arm of a legal
aid agency,'' or through a bar association.12 Sometimes firms send

'Law

Firm Pro Bono Project, Law Firm ProBono Challenge, PRO BONO

INSTITUTE 6 (2010), available at

http://www.probonoinst.org/images/pdfs/law-firm-challengecommentary.pdf
[hereinafter Challenge].
9See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Rethinking the Publicin Lawyers' PublicService:
Pro Bono, Strategic Philanthropy, and the Bottom Line, 77 FORDHAM L. REV.
1435, 1448 (2009) [hereinafter Rhode, Rethinking] (providing examples of law
firms that mindfully structured pro bono partnerships based upon identified
interests).
0

See,

e.g.,

About

Philadelphia

VIP,

PHILADELPHIA

VIP,

http://www.phillyvip.org/content/about-philadelphia-vip (last visited Mar. 7,
2011) (coordinating volunteers through one agency, which refers clients to
volunteers).
"See, e.g., Volunteer Opportunities: Pro Bono, LEGAL AID SOCIETY OF THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, http://www.legalaiddc.org/volunteer/probono.html (last

visited Mar. 7, 2011) (describing the pro bono referral program operated through
the D.C. Legal Aid Society).
12 See, e.g., Free Legal Services, NEW HAMPSHIRE BAR ASSOCIATION,

http://www.nhbar.org/for-the-public/free-legal-services.asp (last visited Mar. 7,

2010-2011

Bottom-Line-DrivenPro Bono

43

their young associates to pro bono fairs where public interest
agencies, hosted by a large law firm, set up tables and compete for
the attention of idealistic young attorneys. 13 And often, large firms
will accept pro bono cases as a result of a public interest agency
reaching out either to a pro bono coordinator or an attorney at the
firm.
Just as the sources of pro bono cases may vary, the
collaborative nature of the pro bono relationship is not always the
same.14 Some firms prefer to take pro bono cases as the only
counsel on the case. In those situations, the case is referred to the
firm, but any ongoing relationship with the agency that was the
source of the case takes the form of informal technical assistance,
and not a formalized co-counsel relationship.15 In other situations,
pro bono partners prefer a formalized co-counsel relationship,
usually memorialized in a co-counsel agreement.16 Even within
that subset of pro bono cases, relationships between the public
interest and firm attorney can vary. In some circumstances, there
is a clear lead counsel relationship, in which either the firm
attorney or public interest lawyer takes the lead in a case and the
other attorney takes on a more limited role, circumscribed by that

2011) (describing the pro bono referral program operated through the New
Hampshire Bar Association).
" See, e.g., ProBono Week, CHICAGO BAR ASSOCIATION,

http://www.chicagobarfoundation.org/pro-bono-week (last visited Mar. 7, 2011)
(promoting pro bono work through the Chicago Bar Association and legal
community).
14 See Scott L. Cummings, The Politics of Pro Bono, 52 UCLA L. REv. 1, 42
(2004) [hereinafter Cummings, Politics] (providing examples of different modes
of collaboration).
15 See id. at 42 (describing the Volunteer Legal Services Program of the Bar
Association of San Francisco as an example of a referral/technical assistance
relationship).
16 See id. at 46-48 (describing the co-counseling model of the Lawyers'
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law).

44
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attorney's specialized expertise in a certain aspect of the case, or
by the limited resources of the public interest agency.'
The remainder of this Article will focus solely on pro bono
arrangements that develop directly between an institutionalized pro
bono program at a law firm and a public interest agency, usually
resulting in a co-counsel relationship for the purpose of
representation of a particular client. This Article contemplates
relationships in which either the firm attorney or the public interest
lawyer takes the lead. This Article does not distinguish between
relationships that are initiated by the firm and those initiated by the
public interest agency. Although a fascinating topic, the nature of
relationships between firms and pro bono referral services or other
sources of pro bono cases is beyond the scope of this Article.
The term "public interest," like "pro bono," contains a
multitude of meanings.
When the legal community makes
reference to "public interest law," it generally means legal work
that is performed for a particular disadvantaged group or political
cause, usually at no charge to the client.' 8 The "public interest
lawyer" is thought to be one who works for a nonprofit, or
sometimes a government entity.
But again, there is little agreement as to what "counts" as
public interest law, and who "counts" as a public interest lawyer.
Surely, an attorney working for a federally funded legal aid
organization that focuses on providing routine legal services to the
poor is a "public interest lawyer," but what about a so-called
"cause lawyer" who litigates only impact cases in the service of
law reform or certain political aims? 19 If a public defender is a
public interest lawyer, then is a prosecutor? Is a lawyer who
litigates impact cases a "public interest lawyer," or must one
17 See id. at 48 (describing the flexible approach of the ACLU of Southern
California).
18 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) ( "public interest-the
general
welfare of the public that warrants recognition and protection.").
19
See, e.g., SARAT & SCHEINGOLD,, supra note 7, at 3 (noting that while "cause
lawyers" and "poverty lawyers" are generally both included under the "public
interest" umbrella, some scholars take pains to make distinctions between the
two).
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provide direct legal services in order to qualify for the title?
Clearly, this poses a definitional problem.
Unlike the term "pro bono," there is no working definition
of "public interest" that is necessarily used as a ground rule in the
transactions between pro bono attorneys and the nonprofit
organizations with which they frequently partner. For the purposes
of this Article, references to "public interest lawyer" will mean
either "cause lawyer" or "poverty lawyer"-an attorney working in
a nonprofit setting who engages in either impact litigation or direct
legal services for the benefit of a particular disadvantaged group or
cause. This Article does not include government lawyers in its
definition of "public interest lawyer," not because their work is
outside the public interest (whatever that means), but because the
needs and working conditions of government lawyers and their
relationships with private-sector pro bono programs are often quite
different than those of attorneys working at nonprofits.2 0
III.

THE EMERGENCE OF
INSTITUTIONALIZED, BOTTOM-LINEDRIVEN PRO BONO PROGRAMS

This Article proposes that the current incarnation of pro
bono can harm public interest agencies with which it comes into
contact. In order to understand how this is possible, it is necessary
to first understand how modern-day pro bono programs came to be
structured and motivated the way they are, and how they came to
be inextricably linked to the realm of public interest law. This
section will briefly sketch the history of pro bono, the way in
which it came to be linked with public interest lawyering, and the
There is another class of public interest lawyers whose sole occupation is in
the recruitment, training, and mentoring of pro bono attorneys. These attorneys
generally work for pro bono referral services. Although their work is vital to the
modern-day pro bono system, they are not the focus of this Article because their
relationship to pro bono attorneys is different than that of public interest
attorneys employed at organizations that provide legal services to clients.
20
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bottom-line-oriented lens through which large firms have
apparently come to view their pro bono endeavors.
Earlier in our history, pro bono was a far simpler idea than
it is today. It was initially thought of as an unanticipated extension
of professional courtesy toward community members who could
not afford the services of their local attorney, 21 or as part of a
quasi-religious obligation to assist the poor.22 Until the late
nineteenth century there existed virtually no formal institutional
scaffolding on which to construct expectations about pro bono
-23
services.
The writing of nineteenth-century legal ethicist David
Hoffman illustrates the prevailing view of pro bono during the time
when legal ethics was in its infancy.24 Hoffman's writing reflects a
view of pro bono obligation as neither part of a grand scheme of
social change nor a public relations gambit, but rather through the
narrower lens of an attorney's ethical duty to an existing or
prospective client. Hoffman's 1836 Fifty Resolutions in Regardto
ProfessionalDeportment25 includes the following Resolution:
XVIII. To my clients... I shall never close my ear
or heart because my client's means are low. Those
who have none, and who have just causes, are, of all
others, the best entitled to sue, or to be defended;
and they shall receive a due portion of my services,
cheerfully given. 26
Cummings, Politics,supra note 15, at 8.
Susan D. Carle, Lawyers' Duty to Do Justice: A New Look at the History of
the 1908 Canons,24 LAW& Soc. INQUIRY 1, 10 (1999).
23 The Alabama State Bar promulgated the first state code of
attorney ethics in
1887. Judith L. Maute, Changing Conceptions of Lawyers' Pro Bono
Responsibilities: From ChanceNoblesse Oblige to StatedExpectations, 77 TUL.
L. REv. 91, 107 (2002).
24
d. at 103.
25 Id. Maute characterizes this document as "the first serious effort to formulate
principles of legal ethics for American lawyers." Id.
26 Id. at 104 (quoting DAVID HOFFMAN, Hoffman's Fifty Resolutions in Regard
21
22

to ProfessionalDeportment, in A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY 752 (2d ed. 1836),
reprintedin HENRY S. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS, app. E, at 342 (1953)).
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Thus, the nineteenth century view of pro bono seemed to presume
that pro bono's relevance would arise when an individual of the
sort who would ordinarily become a regular, fee-paying client of
the attorney could not pay the full expected fee. There was little
sense in this conception of pro bono that the attorney ought to seek
out non-paying clients, or that the attorney ought to practice
outside his area of comfort in order to serve an indigent client, or
that pro bono service ought to somehow serve a particular cause
that would transcend the client's own case.27 This limited,
"reactive" view of pro bono would, however, radically change over
the next century, as a number of social forces merged to recast pro
bono as a complex institution meant to serve different masters for
different reasons. For the reasons outlined below, the legal
community's conceptualization of pro bono shifted from the
simple, ad hoc provision of legal services without charge to an
institutionalized program that, while it derives its client base from
the public interest sphere, is actually structured to serve the
business needs of the law firm.
The institutionalization of pro bono cannot be explained
without first noting how the provision of legal services to the poor
changed in the latter half of the nineteenth century through the
innovation of the legal aid society. The first legal aid society was
founded in New York City in 1876, under the auspices of the
German Society of New York, which sought to protect New
York's burgeoning population of German immigrants from
exploitation at the hands of the dominant culture. 28 Cummings
notes that the legal aid society "compartmentalized the bar's
Maute refers to this conception of pro bono as essentially "reactive." Id.Note
that Maute considers the writing of Hoffman's contemporary George Sharswood
to be slightly more "proactive" regarding the bar's obligation to serve the poor.
However, Maute does not suggest that Sharswood's conception of pro bono is
radically different than that of Hoffman, or that anything like the current pro
bono model existed in the nineteenth century.
28
See generally, The History of the Legal Aid Society, THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY
http://www.legal-aid.org/en/las/aboutus/ ourhistory.aspx, (last visited Mar. 18,
2011) (providing background on New York City's legal aid work).
27
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service obligation, assigning it to a cadre of full-time staff
attorneys housed in separate offices," a service model that we
currently take for granted but which was a true innovation in its
day. 29 The idea of an agency devoted to serving the legal needs of
the poor quickly caught on, and over the next several decades the
concept of the legal aid society expanded dramatically, both in
terms of geography and client population. Poor clients now had a
choice-seek out services from a for-profit attorney who might
provide the service for free, or look instead to the newer model of
the legal aid society for help.
The for-profit and public interest bars became enmeshed in
the provision of free services on an institutional level at least partly
as a result of the bubble and burst of publicly funded civil legal aid
in the middle to late twentieth century. During the 1960s, the
Johnson administration's "War on Poverty" launched a massive
increase in federal funding for civil legal aid programs. 30 Those
programs were ambitious both in scope and in their goals, which
were unapologetically progressive and aimed at eradicating
poverty.31 This new breed of poverty lawyer did not merely aim to
assist the poor with legal problems; rather, many legal aid
programs explicitly adopted the reformist agenda and tactics of the
various social justice movements of the time.3 2
The aggressive law reform agenda of the 1960s and 1970s
unleashed an equally fierce backlash during the Reagan era. This
resulted in massive cuts to the federal legal aid program, both in
terms of the available funding and the work in which federally
funded agencies were permitted to engage. 33
The smallgovernment, corporatist ideology driving the evisceration of the
29
30

Cummings, Politics,supra note 15, at 13.
Id. at 15 n.75.

31Id. at 15.
32

Id.

3 Scott L. Cummings & Deborah L. Rhode, PublicInterest Litigation:Insights

from Theory andPractice,36 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 603, 620 (2009) [hereinafter
Cummings & Rhode]; See also Cummings, Politics, supra note 15, at 22
(enumerating the many indignities inflicted upon recipients of federal Legal
Services Corporation funding during the Reagan era).
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federal legal aid program sought in part to replace professionalized
poverty lawyers with volunteerism and contract work from the
private sector, through an innovation called Private Attorney
Involvement (PAI).34 PAL, enshrined in the federal Legal Services
Corporation35 (LSC) regulations since the early Reagan era,
requires LSC-funded legal aid offices to use 12.5% of their annual
LSC funding to "encourage the involvement of private attorneys in
the delivery of legal assistance to eligible clients through both pro
bono and compensated mechanisms." 36
Thus, PAI created a very real incentive for federally funded
legal aid programs to involve private attorneys in the provision of
legal services to the poor, since the federal regulations actually
provide for penalties for noncompliance with the 12.5% goal.37
LSC-funded agencies used PAI money to engage in the
institutionalization of pro bono through a variety of delivery
mechanisms, including local bar associations and nonprofit pro
bono referral agencies, whose sole raison d'etre is matching pro
bono cases with private attorneys.3 8
Changes in the structure of large law firms in the middle
twentieth century positioned these firms as the most likely partners
in the institutionalization of pro bono. Scott Cummings identifies
the trend toward internally institutionalized pro bono as beginning
in the 1960s and taking off in the 1990s, when pro bono
3 Public Welfare, 45 C.F.R. §1614.1 (2010).
35 The Legal Services Corporation is an independent, nonprofit 501(c)(3)
corporation that was created by Congress in 1974 to distribute federal funds to
legal aid providers throughout the nation. What is LSC? LEGAL SERVICES
CORPORATION, http://www.1sc.gov/about/1sc.php (last visited Mar. 18, 2011).
36 45 C.F.R. §1614.2(a).
See id. at § 1614.7 ("Failure to comply: (a) If a recipient fails to comply with
the expenditure required by this part and if that recipient fails without good
cause to seek a waiver during the term of the grant or contract, the Corporation
shall withhold from the recipient's support payments an amount equal to the
difference between the amount expended on PAl and twelve and one-half
percent (12 1/2 %) of the recipient's basic field award.").
38 Cummings, Politics,supra note
15, at 24.
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opportunities began to find use as recruiting tools for quickly
expanding law firms. 39 Firms began to create structures through
which decisions could be made regarding which pro bono cases to
take, cases accepted by the firm could be doled out to the
appropriate attorneys, and pro bono participation could be
tracked. 40 Many hired pro bono coordinators-full time, dedicated
staffers whose entire job revolves around screening potential pro
bono cases, routing them to appropriate attorneys, and shouldering
primary responsibility for the firm's image as dispensers of legal
largesse.41 Thus, large law firms, with their far-superior resources
and internally institutionalized pro bono delivery structure, became
a natural partner for participation in pro bono cases.42
As a result of these historical forces, the American legal
system now houses a highly formalized system of pro bono service
provision, in which cases are systematically presented to public
interest or pro bono referral agencies, vetted, and then moved
down the pipeline to in-house pro bono programs. However, the
output of this pro bono factory has not been as robust as one might
expect. In fact, scholars and bar leaders seem deeply concerned
that American attorneys as a class remain intransigently
disinterested in providing services for free.43 Thus, a cottage
industry has sprung up around prodding, cajoling, and generally
exhorting the private bar to give more of its time to those who
cannot normally afford its services.
Legal ethicists have promulgated a variety of rationales for
an obligation to perform pro bono service, engaging in a debate
largely focused on whether pro bono ought to be mandatory or
voluntary. Some scholars, focusing on the origin of lawyers'
39

Id. at 36-40.
Id. at 39-40.
41
Id. at 58.
40

42Id at 55.
43 See, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE, PRO BONO IN PRINCIPLE AND IN PRACTICE 20

(2005) [hereinafter RHODE, PRINCIPLE] ("[I]n most jurisdictions, participation
rates in pro bono activity, variously defined, range between 15% to 18% . . . . In

short, the best available research finds that American lawyers average less than
half an hour per week and under half a dollar per day in support of pro bono
legal assistance.").
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moral obligation to perform pro bono, have made the case that
lawyers' monopoly on the provision of legal services ought to give
rise to an ethical obligation to ensure that those services are made
available to those who cannot pay market rate.4 4 Others have
focused on the need for greater access to justice among poor
Such appeals seem generally consistent with the
clients.4 5
historical definition of pro bono service as a moral duty to serve
those who are indigent but whose cause is worthy, and recall
Hoffman's nineteenth-century vow to "never close my ear or heart
because my client's means are low."46
Despite its best attempts to focus on moral aspiration,
however, another theme runs through the literature on pro bono;
namely, the ancillary benefits that will flow to law firms and
attorneys that participate in pro bono endeavors. For example,
Deborah Rhode enumerates specific benefits to the careers of
attorneys who engage in pro bono work, including training, the
amassing of contacts and reputation enhancement. 47 Rhode also
notes an additional category of benefit accruing to legal employers
who encourage and facilitate pro bono, and includes in that
category such benefits as improved retention, recruitment, and
enhancements to the reputation of the firm.48 Notwithstanding
these benefits, Rhode attempts to reinforce her view that these
benefits ought not to become the raison d'etre for pro bono,
44 See, e.g., DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 282-89

(1988) (providing the monopoly rationale for the concept of mandatory pro
bono).
45 Se generally, RHODE, PRINCIPLE, supranote 44, at 26-29 (arguing that access
to justice is a fundamental interest and is critical for the poor).
46 Maute, supranote 24, at 104 (footnote omitted).
47 Deborah Rhode, Profits andProfessionalism,33 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 49, 58
(2005) [hereinafter Rhode, Profits]; See also Ronit Dinovitzer & Bryant G.
Garth, Pro Bono as an Elite Strategy in Early Lawyer Careers, in PRIVATE
LAWYERS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 115, 127-33 (Robert Granfield & Lynn

Mather eds., 2009); Cummings, Politics,supra note 15, at 102-03.
Rhode, Profits,supranote 48, at 60; See also, Cummings, Politics,supranote
15, at 33, 110-11.
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asserting that "to justify pro bono involvement in solely
instrumental terms may undermine its moral significance and
distort charitable priorities." 49
However, as one moves away from the scholarly realm
toward publications meant for consumption by decision-makers in
large law firms, direct appeals to these "bottom-line" motivations
seem to edge out more principled reasons for engaging in pro bono
activity. Endeavors such as the Pro Bono Institute's Law Firm Pro
Bono Project, which is specifically geared toward increasing largefirm participation in pro bono activities,5 0 emphasize the bottomline benefits of pro bono service as a primary reason for pro bono
participation.
For example, the Pro Bono Institute provides a thirteenpage publication (available for download) on its website, entitled
Making the Business Case for Pro Bono.5 Even the title of the
piece, on its own, unambiguously telegraphs the message that the
reader should be interested in knowing how pro bono serves the
bottom line. The Introduction to the piece, however, reads a little
like an apology for what will follow:
In making the case for why lawyers-and legal
institutions-should undertake pro bono work,
supporters of pro bono service typically focus on
the compelling need for such assistance. Countless
national, state, and local studies have detailed the
appalling gap that exists between the millions who
need, but are unable to afford or obtain, the
specialized knowledge and skills of legal
professionals to protect and vindicate basic human
49 Rhode, Profits, supra note 48, at 61.
50 See PRO BONO INSTITUTE, supra note 8 ("The Project's goal is
to fully

integrate pro bono into the practice, philosophy, and culture of firms so
that larger law firms provide the institutional support, infrastructure, and
encouragement essential to fostering a climate supportive of pro bono
service and promoting partner and associate participation.")
51 Esther F. Lardent, Making the Business Case for Pro Bono, THE PRO BONO
INSTITUTE (2000), http://www.probonoinst.org/pdfs/businesscase.pdf.
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needs and fundamental rights versus the shockingly
limited resources available to meet those needs.
Others focus on the ethical underpinnings of pro
bono service-every lawyer's fundamental responsibility to ensure equal access to justice. Linked to
this ethical imperative is the pivotal role played by
pro bono in maintaining the professionalism of the
legal profession. As lawyers seeking to preserve the
highest ideals of our profession, we must concern
ourselves not only with the bottom line, but also
with the greater public good.
Given the profound changes in and enormous
pressures of law firm practice today, however, it is
essential that pro bono supporters, without
abandoning the moral and ethical principles at the
heart of pro bono service, can confidently identify
those elements of pro bono practice that, when
appropriately structured and integrated into the
fabric of the firm, result in positive benefits for the
law firm and its attorneys, as well as for the clients
and communities served.52
Following that half-page acknowledgment that there are
principled reasons to engage in pro bono, the next eleven or so
pages of the document are devoted to making the following points:
1) pro bono does not decrease profitability; 2) pro bono is an
effective recruitment tool; 3) pro bono is an effective retention
tool; 4) pro bono provides valuable training opportunities; 5) pro
bono provides meaningful opportunities to evaluate the skills of

52

Id. at I.
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younger attorneys; 6) pro bono enhances firm "morale and
loyalty"; and 7) pro bono is an effective marketing tool.5 3
One might wonder if it is possible to simultaneously appeal
to altruistic and materialistic motivations and find success in both
appeals. And in fact, it appears that the large firms may not be
grasping the shaded, complex message that materialistic concerns
should be viewed as a beneficial by-product, but not a driver, of
pro bono programs. Instead, they appear to have seized bottomline motivations for pro bono with both hands.
This phenomenon is evidenced in a recent American Bar
Foundation study of the Chicago legal services market, in which
researchers interviewed a number of pro bono coordinators and
other law firm participants in pro bono. This study paints a very
stark picture of firm motivations. 54 Its interviewees appear to
almost unanimously-and quite un-self-consciously-cite the
bottom-line motivations for pro bono noted above as the primary
or exclusive reason for firm participation in pro bono endeavors.
According to one firm lawyer,
Those of us who manage law firms know that the
pro bono business is good business for large law
firms. It's the value that it has to the law firms in
terms of training young lawyers, improving the
quality of life at the law firms, enhancing our
institutional reputation in the communities where
we practice law, and network with the clients and
judges. There's tremendous value there that far
outweighs any short term costs

... We're not

running a charity here. This is good business and
it[sic]s essential business for large law firms. 5

Id.at 2-11.
See Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Legal Services for the Poor: Access,
Self-Interest, and Pro Bono, in 12 ACCESS TO JUSTICE: SOCIOLOGY OF CRIME,
LAW AND DEVIANCE 145, 145 (Rebecca L. Sandefur ed.,2009) [hereinafter
Daniels & Martin].
5
Id. at 153.
53
54
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The authors of the Bar Foundation study report concluded,
"[law firms look at their investment in pro bono very pragmatically. Certainly, concerns about professional responsibility and
ideas of equal justice (of doing "God's work") are important
considerations, but these interests are clearly secondary for firms
as business entities." 56 Thus, this study solidly supports the view
that the modern large law firm is not engaging in pro bono
principally out of moral obligation (arising from any one of a
number of theorized ethical duties), but instead is involved in the
practice due almost entirely to business considerations.
The American bar's conceptualization and execution of pro
bono has changed dramatically over the course of the last century
and a half. As pro bono has become increasingly institutionalized,
common motivations for engaging in the practice seem to have
drifted from simple altruism toward the poorer members of an
existing client pool to a clear focus on business goals. The
following section considers whether the motivations of modem pro
bono programs matter, specifically whether those motivations
result in programs that inadvertently harm the public interest bar.
IV.

DOES BOTTOM-LINE-MOTIVATED PRO
BONO HURT THE PUBLIC INTEREST BAR?

If pro bono has become overly connected to bottom-line
interests, does it matter from a pragmatic standpoint? If one more
client is served, should anyone care why? If the ultimate goal of
pro bono is not the moral salvation of lawyers but the legal
salvation of clients, does it matter whether the motivation of large
firms derives from the ethics of altruism or from more worldly
goals? This section offers the opinion that sometimes, different
motivations lead to different results. And in the world of pro bono,
a program designed to suit bottom-line needs may, in the service of

56

Id.
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its own agenda, harm the public interest agencies with which it
partners.5 7
Deborah Rhode recently completed a survey of public
interest legal organizations, the results of which are published in
her study of public interest agencies, Public Interest Law. The
Movement at Midlife.58 As part of that survey, Rhode questioned
respondents regarding the success of their interactions with pro
bono attorneys. She observed that, of those public interest
agencies surveyed, "almost half reported extensive or moderate
problems with quality in the pro bono work they obtained from
outside firms." 59 Her survey thus gives us a good general starting
point; all is not rosy in the interactions between pro bono attorneys
and public interest lawyers.
Specifically, Rhode's survey participants alluded to a few
distinct problems with the quality of pro bono services. One
problem arose when firms declined to take certain types of cases,
or "cherry-picked" certain cases over others. 60 Another was the
sense among the survey respondents that pro bono partners did not
commit promised time to pro bono endeavors, particularly when
1 The broader "do motives matter" debate in the pro bono context is not a new
one. Deborah Rhode poses this very question in her 2005 book but does not
direct her answer toward whether non-altruistic motivations have a deleterious
impact on the public interest bar. PRINCIPLE, supra note 44, at 57. Rhode's 2009
article goes further in centralizing the tension between pragmatic and
aspirational motivations for pro bono, worrying aloud that "lawyers' own
pragmatic interests [in pro bono work] have marginalized more socially
responsible considerations and resulted in inadequate evaluation, strategic
planning, and accountability." Rethinking, supranote 10 at 1435. The article
enumerates specific, negative ways in which a bottom-line-oriented pro bono
program differs from one which is motivated by altruistic intentions. The article
attempts to justify, in concrete terms, why there is something wrong with
bottom-line-motivated pro bono. It alludes to, but does not squarely address, the
effect of such programs upon the public interest agencies that provide necessary
clients, mentoring, and training to the pro bono initiative.
58 Deborah L. Rhode, PublicInterest Law: The Movement at Midlife, 60 STAN.
L. REV. 2027 (2008) [hereinafter Rhode, Midlife].
59 Rhode, Rethinking, supra note 10, at 1442 (citing Rhode, Midlife, supra note
59, at 2071).
60 Rhode, Midlife, supra note 59, at 2073.
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paying work became more pressing.61 A third problem was the
inefficiency inherent in relying on inexperienced pro bono counsel,
particularly where the nature of the case was such that almost no
private firm attorney possessed the necessary expertise. 62
I submit that, at their root, the problems identified in
Rhode's survey are a direct result of the bottom-line-oriented
motivations of the pro bono programs themselves. Furthermore, I
suggest that the problems identified by Rhode's survey are not
merely problematic in terms of their impact on the overall quality
of legal services offered to the public, but are actually damaging to
the public interest agencies who partner with pro bono. The
following sections of this Article will examine the problems
identified by Rhode's survey in greater depth, illustrate how those
problems negatively impact the public interest bar, and show how
the bottom-line motivations of firm pro bono programs create and
exacerbate the identified problems.
A. Triage Conflict
Public interest lawyers face what has been evocatively
described as an "ocean of legal need," 63 an endless supply of poor
and disadvantaged clients whose legal needs cannot possibly be
fully met by the scant resources available to public interest
lawyers.64 Deciding who can be served and who will have to go
without "triage" becomes one of the most central, most defining
strategic decisions a public interest agency can make.
61Id. at 2072.
62

Id. at 2071-72.
R. Tremblay, Acting "AVery Moral Type of God": TriageAmong Poor

6, Paul

Clients, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 2475, 2481 (1999).

The Legal Services Corporation has concluded that, for each low-income
person who obtains legal aid through an LSC-funded program, another is turned
away. Documenting the Justice Gap in America: The Current Unmet Civil
64

Legal Needs of Low-Income Americans, LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION (Sept.

2009),

http://www.Isc.gov/pdfs/documenting thejustice gapinamerica

2009.pdf; see generally DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE (2004)

(providing an analysis of legal assistance in America to the poor).
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Every public interest agency has some threshold requirement for services that is obviously built into the agency's very
identity.65 Most of these threshold requirements are somehow tied
to the identity of the client. Agencies subject to the strictures of
LSC funding determine that income will be the first cutoff; the
poor are their constituents.66 Other agencies serve only certain
identifiable groups, such as the disabled, the elderly, the homeless,
or a particular minority. Others structure services differently,
forming the identity of the agency around a particular area of need
- protection from domestic violence, for example, or violations of
civil liberties. But even after that first, most obvious "cut" is
made, the need is usually still too great to fill.
Thus, even among the poor, the elderly, or the disabled,
public interest agencies must create artificial sub-hierarchies of
need in order to triage effectively. 6 7 Sometimes the second cut is
made to favor one legal strategy over another; some agencies
choose cases for their impact potential, while others focus on direct
services to the largest number of clients possible. Others have a
first-come, first-served policy. Others study the needs of the target
community to determine which legal problems are most emergent
and focus attention there. It is in this place-the complex, morally
ambiguous depths of triage-that pro bono programs can pervert
the process most insidiously through a phenomenon I will call
"triage conflict."
Triage conflict arises when the case selection criteria of the
public interest agency are directly challenged by another entity,
whose reasons for selecting cases are completely different than
those of the public interest agency. Triage conflict can arise
65 See

Tremblay, supra note 64, at 2482.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(2)(B) (2010) (enabling the Legal Services Corporation
to establish guidelines for client eligibility based on income considerations).
67 The philosophy behind these kinds of deeper triage decisions differs widely.
For example, there exists a very interesting debate regarding the degree to which
constituent demand for certain services ought to influence triage decisions.
Tremblay, supra note 64, at 2497; but see Justine A. Dunlap, I Don't Want to
Play God - A Response to Professor Tremblay, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2601,
(1999) (rejecting Tremblay's use of hierarchy for case selection).
66
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between a public interest agency and a funder whose institutional
priorities are, for whatever reason, skewed towards accepting cases
and building programs that the public interest agency would not
otherwise prioritize. 68 And triage conflict also frequently arises in
the context of pro bono. Where pro bono seeks to impose its
business agenda on a public interest program, the public interest
program may make determinations about triage that it would not
otherwise make, thus destabilizing the agency through misallocation of scarce human and capital resources. I offer an anecdote
from my own practice that will hopefully serve to show how triage
conflict arises, and the tensions it can create.
When I first became the legal director at a relatively new,
very small LGBT-rights nonprofit, one of my first priorities was to
improve and expand the agency's pro bono collaborations. 6 9 The
agency had enjoyed several extremely helpful collaborations with
local large-firm attorneys already, but most of those collaborations
had emanated from outside the institutionalized pro bono channels.
The attorneys with whom we had collaborated had tended to be
high-powered partners at major firms. They had directly sought
out the agency in order to work towards a goal to which they were
personally committed within their area of expertise. Thus, the
attorneys with whom we had worked in the past could set their
own agendas and were unconstrained by the strictures of an
institutionalized pro bono program and its usual cast of actors.
I had envisioned an expanded program, in which a greater
number of lower-ranked associates who were not necessarily
closely tied to LGBT causes could be matched with pro bono
opportunities at our agency. In the spirit of that goal, I began
68 Cummings & Rhode, supranote 34, at 643.
69 The agency, Equality Advocates Pennsylvania,

provided legal services to
lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) Pennsylvanians in a variety of
substantive areas. Although the agency engaged in impact work, it hosted a
legal hotline that fielded about six hundred requests for assistance per year. The
majority of its cases would fall under a "direct services" model. At the time I
left the agency, it housed three attorneys and one full-time legal clinic manager.
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making a concerted effort to attend events that would help me
network with pro bono coordinators and large-firm attorneys.
Things, I thought, were really going to take off.
I quickly learned that the realities of engaging with a largescale, institutionalized pro bono program were more complicated,
and in many ways more troubling, than I had previously imagined.
One of my first clues came at a cocktail reception for summer
public interest associates hosted by a large firm. At this event, I
initiated a conversation with the pro bono coordinator of a large,
elite firm with whom we had previously enjoyed only limited pro
bono interactions. 70 I introduced myself and told her of my hope
to engage in a pro bono collaboration with her firm. At first, her
interest seemed piqued. She asked me to describe the kind of
opportunities we could offer. Encouraged, I perkily explained that
we had recently launched a project to advocate for LGBT victims
of employment discrimination. Her countenance darkened. "Oh,"
she said ominously. "We would never take a plaintiff-side
employment case. We represent a lot of major employers and that
would really present a positional conflict for us." 71
Momentarily undaunted, I explained that, because our
office provided a variety of services to low-income LGBT clients,
there would be plenty of less controversial work for a pro bono
attorney. I suggested that the firm's attorneys might instead want
to work on second-parent adoptions for poor LGBT people, so that
non-biological parents of children could cement their legal
relationships to the children they were raising. We had a lot of
those cases, they were relatively simple, and the benefit to the
client's family was immeasurable. The pro bono coordinator did
The identity of the pro bono coordinator and the firm are intentionally
omitted.
7' For an excellent analysis of how so-called "positional conflicts" create ethical
tensions within firms and limit the effectiveness of pro bono programs, see
Norman W. Spaulding, The Prophetand the Bureaucrat:PositionalConflicts in
Service Pro Bono Publico, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1395 (1998) (discussing the
challenges to pro bono work when agencies take a position for one pro bono
client in contrast to positions taken with previous clients); see also Cummings,
Politics, supra note 15, at 116 (noting various conflicts law firms face when
working with pro bono clients).
70
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not seem encouraged. "That's not very sexy," she (correctly) noted
with a frown. She bore the resigned look of someone who has just
realized that the person standing before her would require a
remedial explanation.
"Look," she began. "Our associates would find those sorts
of cases boring. What we're looking for are cases that we can put
in our newsletter, like Guantanamo cases, or death penalty cases.
Or asylum. Do you have any asylum cases?" I did not, and the
conversation ended awkwardly with the exchange of business
cards that we both knew would end up in the bottom of a drawer,
unused. 72
In the situation I describe above, the call was an easy one
to make since my office did not have any of the kinds of cases for
which the pro bono coordinator was hunting. Consider the moral
and managerial quandary that would have arisen if, contrary to
what really happened, I had just received a call from a potential
asylum client. Normally, our office would without hesitation refer
the potential client to one of the national groups with specific
expertise in LGBT asylum claims. But had I really wanted to build
my agency's relationship with the pro bono coordinator, I could
have been tempted to take the asylum case, figuring that, with the
resources and clout of the large firm on our side, we would "learn
as we went," and that ultimately, everyone would win. The client
would not need to know that we had never taken a case of that
nature before, if we did everything right.
The problems with that scenario are myriad. Had I taken
the case, my attention would have been diverted toward asylum
and away from the two greatest identified areas of need of our
client population-family law and employment discrimination. I
would have spent a great deal of time and energy on a case that
would have meshed very poorly with the agency's existing human
and capital resources. Supervision of other cases would have
See Daniels & Martin, supranote 55, at 152 (illustrating that this exchange is
reflective of a common attitude toward pro bono among firm attorneys, and not
merely the result of a cocktail-fueled misunderstanding).
72
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suffered as a result. And in the end, the client would have received
services from attorneys far less schooled in asylum law than that
client would otherwise have received had we referred the case as
usual. All of these harms would have befallen my office because
of triage conflict; the pro bono program would have allowed its
own bottom line interests to dictate case selection priorities and the
public interest agency would have capitulated.
When Rhode's survey participants talk about their
frustration with pro bono programs that "cherry-pick"73 cases, they
may be expressing the tension that results from triage conflict.
Some agencies will resist capitulating to pro bono program's triage
hierarchy.
Others-perhaps those agencies possessing fewer
resources and little confidence may, in the face of this sort of
pressure, make decisions that will ultimately subvert the public
interest agency's institutional health.
B. Case Management
Bottom-line-oriented pro bono programs can also damage
public interest programs through a weak or nonexistent
commitment to follow-through, which could undermine the public
interest program's ability to manage cases efficiently and
appropriately. Public interest lawyers often seek out pro bono cocounsel arrangements specifically because they cannot manage
large cases alone.74 Most public interest agencies operate from a
place of scarcity unimaginable to the average large-firm attorney.
Frequently, entire legal departments lack support staff. In addition,
budgets for litigation costs such as court reporters for depositions,
legal research database access, expert witness fees, and
reproduction and filing fees are often anemic or nonexistent. Thus,
a large-firm pro bono attorney can provide not only another body
on a case, but also an entr6e into the resources of the firm, which
can seem like Aladdin's cave of treasure to a public interest
73 See Rhode, Midlife, supra note 59, at 2073.

Cummings, Politics, supra note 15, at 48-49 (providing the example of the
ACLU of Southern California's use of large firm pro bono counsel to manage
class-action litigation).
74

2010-2011

Bottom-Line-DrivenPro Bono

63

attorney acculturated to a world in which having one's own stapler
can be viewed as an enviable luxury.
When public interest staffers make decisions about case
selection, they do so with an acute awareness of the limits of their
own resources and will frequently turn down even the most
promising cases if they cannot find pro bono help. Once it locates
a pro bono partner, the public interest agency becomes entirely
dependent upon the partner for case support that the agency could
never provide on its own. Thus, an uncomfortable situation may
arise in which the public interest attorney assigned to the case may
not be able to execute her duty of zealous representation if the pro
bono partner fails to fulfill its commitments. When pro bono
partners abandon a case, their actions immediately create a case
management problem for the public interest firm. How will the
public interest agency manage the case ethically and effectively
when its lifeline to resources (and possibly expertise) has been
severed?
It seems reasonable to expect that pro bono partners would
take into consideration the tenuous position experienced by the
public interest bar in such a situation, and accordingly take great
pains to diligently execute their responsibilities. And yet, Rhode's
study shows that, from the public interest perspective, pro bono
attorneys do not always behave with such diligence.
Instead,
Rhode's survey participants complained that "firms . . . 'want to

do pro bono work in theory but in practice, don't want to make the
commitment,"' and that firms "look for 'training and opportunities
for bored associates, but don't want to give them the time . . . when

other paid work comes up."'76
In my practice, I have personally experienced several
instances where the pro bono partner, usually a junior associate,
suddenly became unavailable at a critical juncture in the case. In
most situations, the reason was that a paying client's case had
75 Rhode, Midlife, supranote 59, at 2072 (footnote omitted).
76 Id. (citation omitted).
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suddenly become active or the associate had just been assigned to a
paying client's project. This circumstance would usually result in
my office scrambling to take on unexpected pieces of a project or
attempting to locate new pro bono counsel. Thus, my own
experience showed me time and time again that institutional
commitments to pro bono work are often only as strong as the
amount of non-billable time that exists in the life of the pro bono
attorney. As a result, I learned to expect the unexpected in a pro
bono relationship, and be prepared to suddenly have a lot more
work to do than I had originally planned.
The case management problems that arise when public
interest lawyers partner with bottom-line-motivated pro bono
programs are real but they have until now presented themselves in
rather sporadic fashion. Variables include the overall commitment
of the firm to the pro bono enterprise, the political power of the pro
bono attorney within the firm and the ebb and flow of the business
cycle. Recently, however, firms have rolled out a new innovation
in pro bono service delivery that both underscores the bottom-lineoriented nature of many pro bono programs and introduces the
potential to drastically worsen the case management problems
already experienced by public interest agencies when their pro
bono partners disappear. That innovation, the "public interest
deferral" program, arose directly from the recent recession and
concomitant collapse in the market for legal services.
After a period of unprecedented growth, the recent
economic crisis has devastated the market for the kind of
corporate-focused legal services that are the bread and butter of the
large firms. Such firms have experienced serious contractions in
the amount of work available, resulting in massive layoffs, and
sometimes the collapse of entire firms. 77 Many of these recentlydownsized firms were caught in a serious recruiting dilemma
because large corporate firms have generally been structured
according to what has been described as a "pyramid model,"
through which profits are maximized by the hiring of huge
See The Layoff List, AmericanLawyer.com
http://www.law.com/jsp/tal/PubArticleTAL.jsp?
77

(May

19,
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numbers of young associates. 78 Although large firms have since
cut back dramatically on hiring, many found themselves saddled
with a full pipeline of Class of 2009 law graduates to whom offers
had already been extended, but for whom there was essentially no
work. 79
Many firms responded to the influx of now-unusable new
blood by asking these newly minted associates to defer their start
dates, sometimes by a year or more. Firms often offered a portion
of the associate's promised starting salary in exchange, essentially,
for a promise not to go anywhere else.80 The hope was that the
deferred associate could be attached to the firm and yet dormant
until he or she was needed.
Some firm leaders decided, rather than leaving the deferred
associate with nothing to do, they would lend out their deferred
hires to public interest agencies at some lower portion of their
yearly salary. Pro bono advocates such as the Pro Bono Institute
extolled the virtues of such programs, with the expected mix of
appeals to both altruistic and bottom-line motivations.8 1 This
78 Daniel

Thies, Rethinking Legal Education in Hard Times: The Recession,
PracticalLegal Education, and the New Job Market, 59 J. LEGAL EDUC. 598,
600 (2010).
79 See Press Release, Nat'l Ass'n for Law Placement, Entry-Level Recruiting
Volumes Plunge, Some Start Dates Deferred (Mar. 2, 2010), available at
http://www.nalp.org/uploads/2010_Perspectives on Fall 2009_PressRelease.p
df.
80 See, e.g., Karen Sloan, Delay ofGame: More Incoming Associates are Put on
Hold, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 23, 2009, at I (providing examples and commentary on
job deferrals for recent law school graduates); Gina Passarella, K and L Gates,
Morgan Lewis Slash Attorney and Staff Positions: Morgan Delays First-Year
Start Date By One Year, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 10, 2009, at 1, 10
(describing firms' attempts to delay associates' start dates - sometimes by a year
or more).
1 Pro Bono Wire, Turning Deferred Associate Start Dates Into a Pro Bono
Opportunity, PRO BONO INSTITUTE, (Oct. 2010), http://pbi.informz.net/admin3 I/
content/template.asp? [hereinafter Deferred] ("[Y]oung attorneys would then
join the firm with skills and professional confidence that they would not have
otherwise developed during this interim period.

. .

. In addition to being an asset
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idea-the "public interest deferral"-appears to have caught on
quite quickly, and in some geographic areas, such as New York
City, hastily organized into a sort of ad-hoc, city-wide pro bono
corps.82
While it is certainly possible that the public interest deferral
scheme is, to a limited degree, motivated by altruism, its essential
nature and structure strongly reflects bottom-line motivations.
After all, the entire point of the temporary nature of the deferral is
that while the attorney has nothing better to do, public interest
work is fine, but eventually, the deferral will end and the associate
will go back to fulfilling his or her original purpose-generating
profits for the firm. The very fact that these sorts of one-year
deferrals did not exist at most firms prior to the cratering of the
market for corporate legal services shows that the driver here is not
altruism, but rather the firms' bottom-line interests.
The intentionally temporary nature of the deferred
associate's position begs an obvious question regarding the future
case management capabilities of the public interest agency.8 3
to the participating attorneys and firms, these programs are also a significant
benefit for understaffed legal assistance programs, providing them with an
additional full-time equivalent lawyer.").
82 See Report on the Deferred Associate Law Extern Support Program, CITY
BAR JUSTICE CENTER (Mar. 2010), http://www.nylj.com/nylawyer/adgifs/

decisions/03081 Oreport.pdf.
83 Although beyond the scope of this particular discussion, the public interest
deferral program may also harm public interest attorneys in a variety of ways
beyond the case management problem. For example, in some instances,
furloughed attorneys are being sent to nonprofits that have also experienced
contractions of staff and services as a result of the recession. In these situations,
the work of deferred associates is sometimes being explicitly used to replace
laid-off public interest staff attorneys. Petra Pasternak, Public Interest Shops
Announce Cuts, Furloughs, THE RECORDER, May 11, 2009. In 2009, both the
Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights of the San Francisco Bay Area and the
Volunteer Legal Services Program of the Bar Association of San Francisco
experienced significant staff cuts, including layoffs and forced furloughs, and
were "shift[ing] some of the work to law school graduates who have had their
start dates deferred by Big Law firms." Id. In this way, the deferral program,
with its source of free labor, can actually undercut the career opportunities of
public interest attorneys.
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What happens to the deferred attorney's cases when that attorney is
once again raptured back to the world of for-profit law?
This is a question that raises both macro-level and microlevel concerns. On the macro level, public interest agencies, as
well as their funders, are extremely conscious of the fact that new
projects and new staff quickly create dependence upon those
services within the target community. The reputation of the
agency can be irrevocably tarnished, and the impact of new
programs can dissipate, if sustainability is not considered at the
outset of any new public interest project. Once programs are
launched, they quickly reach capacity and new programs that are
not sustained tend to erode both the confidence of the target
population and funders of the public interest agency. 84 If deferred
associates are used to create entirely new programs, or even to add
an attorney to an existing program, the effect may well be to
expand capacity beyond that which is sustainable once the deferred
associate is called back. This eventuality may result in an ultimate
re-contraction of the program, and cause detrimental reputational
effect among both the target population and potential and current
funders of the agency.
In addition to potentially undermining traditionally held
sustainability concerns, the public interest deferral program may
also create more mundane, micro-level case management
problems. When a deferred attorney leaves, something has to
happen to the cases he or she leaves unfinished. There are three
possible courses of action here. The first course of action is that
the firm does not allow the deferred associate to take any of her
public interest agency cases with her when she returns, and her
entire caseload is essentially dumped on the staff attorneys at the
agency. This situation poses an ethical hazard for the public
This is why public interest fellowship programs like Equal Justice Works
specifically prioritize public interest projects that "create lasting institutions or
84

programs."

See

Eligibility

and

Criteria, EQUAL

JUSTICE

http://www.equaljusticeworks.org/programs/fellowships/criteria
Mar. 7, 2011).

(last

WORKS,

visited
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interest agency. Depending upon the wording of the representation
or co-counsel agreement, a managing attorney or legal director of a
public interest agency may find herself or himself scrambling to reassign numerous cases under threat of potential malpractice.8 5
The second course of action is that the deferred associate is
allowed to take her entire caseload along with her. Although this
would avoid an enormous case management problem at the public
interest agency, it is unlikely that the firm would allow this, since
the very purpose of calling back the associate is to start working on
paying-client projects. 86
The third possibility is a more nuanced compromise, where
the deferred associate carefully winds down cases over time, or
perhaps is assigned only projects that do not involve direct
representation. Such a compromise, however, might never have
been thought out by either the firm or the public interest agency;
while some deferral programs appear to have been created as a
result of very specific negotiations between individual public
interest agencies and pro bono partners, others seem to have been
designed far less mindfully.
In 2009, the Pro Bono Institute, in an admirable attempt to
bring order to the new reality of deferred associate management,
promulgated a set of best practices for firms trying to place
deferred associates. 87 This document does an excellent job of
setting out general ground rules for these new partnerships and is
particularly focused on helping firm attorneys understand how the
Ostensibly, public interest agencies might be able to ameliorate this threat by
designing representation agreements that link the client only to the deferred
attorney and that attorney's firm, and not to the public interest agency. This
would sidestep any obligation for public interest regular staff to step in and take
over cases for the deferred attorney.
16 Although outside the scope of this Article, there are potentially serious
problems involved with allowing deferred associates to take cases with them
when they depart, mainly centered around the question of whether anyone works
at the firm who has the expertise to supervise those attorneys in the kind of work
they performed for the public interest agency.
15

87 Law Firm Attorneys Displacedby the Economic Downturn: Best Practices

and Guidance for Effective Pro Bono Engagement, PRO BONO INSTITUTE
(2009), http://www.probonoinst.org/pdfs/DisplacedAttorneys.pdf
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deferred associate model impacts the human and capital resources
of a public interest agency. However, its section on how to avoid
large-scale, potentially calamitous case management problems
when deferred associates are called back to their firms is very short
on detail, making little more than a general statement that "[i]t
would be unrealistic to think that at the time associates leave their
host organizations and (re)join their firms, all of their ongoing
matters will have been resolved. Firms should develop a plan for
handling open matters and contemplate that associates would be
bringing with them to the firm a number of active pro bono
matters."88
Thus, the public interest deferral program provides a fairly
comprehensive illustration of the numerous ways in which a pro
bono program that is structured to meet bottom-line needs can
negatively affect the case management capability of the public
interest partner. Assuming the economy recovers in the near
future, it will be fascinating (and possibly troubling) to see how
these issues reach resolution as associates are called back to forprofit law.
C. Efficiency
It is natural to assume that pro bono increases the overall
efficiency of public interest offices by serving additional clients in
a given period of time. However, this may not always be the case.
Rhode's survey participants, for example, expressed real
frustration with the inefficiency of their pro bono collaborations. 89
There appeared to be two major threads of complaint. The first
thread was, as interpreted by Rhode, the fact that "[flor some
organizations, the highly specialized nature of their work made it
inefficient to rely on inexperienced counsel, and few pro bono
attorneys had the relevant skill sets." 90 The second thread seemed
to be less about the lack of expertise in a particular area of
8

89

Id. at 18.

See Rhode, Midlife, supra note 59, at 2071-72.

90 Id.
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substantive law, and more about the fact that the pro bono lawyers
were simply very inexperienced.
Rhode quoted one survey
participant as complaining about having to "train a junior associate
in how to take a deposition." 9 1
Why is this the case? Is inefficiency simply an unavoidable
byproduct of the pro bono relationship? I submit that it is a
byproduct not of the relationship itself but rather of the bottom-line
motivations of large firm pro bono programs. As I demonstrate
below, those motivations compel pro bono programs to maximize
the amount of time spent on cases and minimize the level of
expertise of attorneys assigned to pro bono projects. This creates
an overall drag on the efficiency of public interest offices by
requiring public interest lawyers to spend disproportionately large
amounts of time training unskilled associates, in exchange for
work that is performed far more slowly and inefficiently than
would otherwise be performed by the public interest agency alone.
In an ideal pro bono world, a firm would always send its
most qualified attorneys to a pro bono project. Pro bono litigation,
for example, would be handled by senior associate or partner
litigators, even where the litigation itself would not necessarily be
the most complex. The obvious efficiency advantages to such a
system are myriad. A more experienced attorney is likely to
perform more work more quickly, while at the same time being
less prone to technical errors or strategic blunders. A more
experienced attorney would also place less of a training and
supervision burden on the shoulders of an already-overworked
public interest managing attorney or legal director, leaving that
attorney's time free to perform other work.92 A more experienced
attorney would likely also be able to get up to speed more quickly
on those highly specialized matters that are usually strictly the
province of the public interest bar.

91Id. at 2072.

In fact, using experienced attorneys for pro bono matters frequently provides
an important learning experience and mentorship for the public interest attorney
partner, who frequently receives less formal training than his or her law firm
counterpart.
92
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Sadly, large firms are not encouraged to follow this model
of pro bono. In fact, they are largely encouraged to follow the
opposite model, wherein firms send their least-experienced staff to
pro bono projects. Two major motivations exist for a firm
prioritizing pro bono among its least-experienced staff. First, pro
bono is expressly sold to large firms as a kind of free training for
unseasoned attorneys. 93 This makes good business sense, due to
the cost-free nature of the training offered through pro bono (as
opposed to CLE), combined with the relatively low rate at which
these attorneys' time can be billed.
Second, when large firms are publicly ranked in terms of
their pro bono participation, the ranking considers only hours spent
on pro bono, and not outcomes, number of clients served, or any
other measurement of success. 94 In other words, one attorney
working for sixty hours on a single case that the attorney
ultimately loses in spectacular fashion is worth more to the
American Lawyer ("AmLaw") ranking than that same attorney
working for twenty hours on two different cases, one of which she
wins and one of which settles amicably. Thus, the pro bono
ranking model itself may create a disincentive for firms motivated
by the bottom line to send anyone but newer, cheaper, and less
efficient attorneys to pro bono matters.
However well this model serves private firms' motivations
to obtain free training for new associates and rise in the AmLaw
rankings, the efficiency of the public interest bar suffers as a result.
When public interest attorneys partner with very inexperienced pro
See Deferred,supranote 81 ("Pro bono is one of the most effective and least
costly means of providing skills training and professional development.").
94 American Lawyer, which ranks large law firms' pro bono performance,
creates its "Am Law Pro Bono 100" based on an aggregate "pro bono score."
According to American Lawyer, "[h]alf of the score comes from the average pro
bono hours per lawyer; the other half represents the percentage of lawyers who
perform more than 20 hours of pro bono work." The Am Law Pro Bono 100:
93

Going in Deep, AMERICANLAWYER.COM, http://www.law.com/jsp/tal/probono.

jsp (last visited Mar. 19, 2011).
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bono attorneys, the public interest attorney must spend an
inordinate amount of time training the pro bono attorney.
Similarly, the public interest attorney must closely supervise the
work of the pro bono attorney to ensure that the work is performed
competently, which takes a great deal of time. Of course, this is all
part of the design of many pro bono programs, but it has the
immediate effect of pulling the public interest partner away from
other work for the express purpose of providing valuable but costfree training to young associates.
Although inefficiency may be rewarded from the big firm
perspective, it is absolutely deadly to the public interest lawyer and
his or her agency. There are two important reasons why this is the
case. First of all, it is a well-accepted truism that almost every
public interest agency faces a client population whose size vastly
outstrips the resources available to the agency. 95 Second, unlike
large law firms, public interest agencies are frequently beholden to
multiple funders who operate from an outcome-driven perspective. 96 Whether a foundation, a fellowship program, or a government agency, major funders of public interest endeavors almost
universally require the submission of post-funding reports, which
specifically document what was done with the donated funds
during a grant period. 97 For funders of public interest agencies, the
benchmark for success is volume of clients served and, to a lesser
9 LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, supra note 65, at 9.

See Cummings & Rhode, supra note 34, at 620. Cummings and Rhode note
the shift from federal public interest funding to diverse sources of private
foundation funding, which carries additional fundraising burdens. The authors
also note that reliance on such sources of funding may further warp
organizational priorities, as public interest agencies strive to structure their
services to draw support from funders. Id.
97 Funders are often themselves accountable to a higher power, which wants to
know how well the funder is supervising the grant program, and how well it is
acting as a steward of what is frequently taxpayer money. Recently, for
example, LSC came under fire from the federal Government Accountability
Office in a report that accused LSC of lax supervision of its grant program. See
96

generally U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-540, LEGAL SERVICES
CORPORATION: IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN CONTROLS OVER GRANT AWARDS

AND GRANTEE PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS (2010) (discussing the improvements

that LSC needs to make).
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but increasing extent, the outcome of cases. 98 Thus, while AmLaw
drives large firms towards inefficiency in the execution of pro
bono by rewarding more hours spent, regardless of outcomes or
volume served, grantors drive public interest agencies in the
opposite direction towards volume served and outcomes.
One might object to this characterization of the problem by
pointing out that this kind of situation makes sense when a higher
volume of pro bono assistance is assumed. For example, it would
be highly inefficient to create training materials and a supervision
program for a single attorney working on a single matter, but the
efficiency problem would be solved if the public interest partner
created a training program that would be used for many attorneys
on many matters, or for a few attorneys who would work on many
matters over time. Theoretically, this may be true. In practice,
however, there is little guarantee that the investment in training
and supervision will ever result in increased efficiency at the
public interest office.
I offer another anecdote from practice to illustrate this
point. While acting as legal director of the above-mentioned
nonprofit, I received an e-mail from a young, inexperienced
contract attorney at a major law firm. She and two colleagues
were experiencing a temporary lull in their workloads and wished
to assist my agency on pro bono matters. Naturally, I was excited.
This was akin to manna from heaven, since the addition of three
attorneys amounted to a doubling of my legal staff. Understanding
that these lawyers were relatively new to law practice and had been
spending their careers largely engaged in document review, I

For example, a major funder of public interest activity in Pennsylvania is the
Pennsylvania Interest on Lawyers' Trust Account (PA-IOLTA) Board, which
disseminated $36 million in funds between 2004-2008. PA-IOLTA has specific
requirements for reporting both volumes and outcome, reflected in its annual
report, Pennsylvania Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts. Results of the
PennsylvaniaAccess to JusticeAct: Executive Summary of the Five-Year Report
on the Filing -Fee SurchargeLaw, FY 2004-2008, PENNSYLVANIA LEGAL AID
NETWORK, INC., (Feb. 2009), http://www.paiolta.org/AJAReport/summary.pdf.
98
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recognized that their skill sets would be somewhat limited and set
about determining which tasks the three lawyers could learn and
execute most efficiently.
Ultimately, I determined that I would train this set of
lawyers in the relatively low-skill, high-volume area of name
changes. In recent years, our office had been inundated with
requests from transgender individuals seeking legal name
changes. 99 Name changes seemed like a perfect introduction to
lawyering with actual clients, since the process would involve a
simple client interview, fact-gathering, filing of a relatively
standard petition, accumulation of various documents such as
judgment searches and a final appearance in court where there was
no contested hearing. I imagined ultimately deploying a fleet of
inexperienced attorneys who, with a little patience and handholding, would ultimately be able to provide critical help to a high
volume of individuals who had a real and pressing need for
service.
Excited, I committed the better part of several work days to
the production of training materials for this new endeavor. I put
together a manual, a set of model pleadings and various checklists.
I scheduled and personally led a training session for the three
attorneys. When the training session was concluded, I sent the
team their first client, assuming that one of the attorneys would
start on that client and the other two would wait for the next name
change intake.
But a strange thing happened. Somehow, the pro bono
coordinator at the attorneys' firm decided that it would be best to
Transgender individuals frequently find themselves saddled with birth names
that are incongruous with their gender presentation (i.e. a person of male
appearance named "Shirley").
Transgender individuals often face
discrimination, harassment, and even violence when forced to present identity
documentation that bears a gender-incongruous name, so name changes are a
critical need. See generally The Mazzoni Center Guide to Changing Your Name
and Identity Documents in Pennsylvania2010 Edition, THE MAZZONI CENTER,
(2010)
http://mazzonicenter.org/sites/72.27.231.119/files/ma resources/Changing%20Y
our%/o20NameLegal%/2ODocSept%/202010.pdf (providing detailed steps and
what to expect when changing one's name).
99
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assign all three of the attorneys to that single name change. I did
not object because-out of a shameful combination of confusion
and cowardice-I didn't think I really had the power to do so.
Consequently, all three attorneys interviewed the client, had
regular meetings to discuss the progress of the name change, and
they all helped prepare the case. As far as I am aware, all three
may well have attended the hearing. Contrary to my intention, I
had apparently created the single most over-lawyered name change
case in the history of Pennsylvania civil procedure: a veritable
masterpiece of inefficiency.
Theoretically, this first case could have been an anomaly, a
sort of training-wheels case, after which each of the contract
attorneys would begin to fly solo and my agency would begin to
see a payoff in its significant resource investment. However, while
all three attorneys expressed great enthusiasm, our collective good
intentions ultimately manifested virtually nothing as none of the
three attorneys ever took another name change case; one quit the
firm, and the remaining two were assigned new projects that
quickly eradicated the spare time they had previously enjoyed.
This anecdote is intended to illustrate a few points. First,
the behavior of large law firms in pro bono transactions frequently
appears to be geared toward maximizing training opportunities for
inexperienced attorneys, even at the expense of the public interest
agencies' efficiency. Second, public interest agencies cannot count
on large-firm pro bono programs to provide sufficient pro bono
assistance to ensure the recoupment of training costs. Thus, unless
a large firm pro bono program is especially mindful about
balancing its own goals with that of the public interest partner, it
can inadvertently cause injury to the efficiency of the public
interest office with which it partners.
In sum, the American legal establishment has, for quite a
long while, attempted to walk a very fine line. In attempting to
boost embarrassingly low levels of pro bono participation, bar
leaders have both extolled the moral virtues of pro bono
participation while simultaneously appealing to firms' baser
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instincts. It seems that firms have mainly absorbed the more
worldly justifications for pro bono, structuring many programs
specifically to serve the firm's business needs. It is time for the
bar to recognize the uncomfortable fact that not only are the
motivations of those programs expressed in the manner in which
they function, but in fact the ways these motivations are expressed
can actually damage public interest partners in the exercise of pro
bono.
V.

OFFSETTING HARMS CAUSED BY
BOTTOM-LINE MOTIVATIONS

Let us assume that pro bono programs that are motivated by
the bottom line can and do harm the public interest agencies with
which they partner. What then? This section seeks to answer this
question by noting that public interest attorneys do, in fact, possess
the necessary power to effectively resist harmful pro bono
collaborations. The section goes on to suggest two specific
strategies through which public interest lawyers could alter the
terms of pro bono collaborations to minimize the harms caused by
the bottom-line motivations of pro bono programs.
A. Conceptualizing Public Interest Lawyers as
Empowered to Resist
As a threshold matter, it is critical to recognize that public
interest lawyers do have power in the pro bono transaction, and
thus may seriously consider whether they wish to demand
alteration to the terms of some pro bono alliances. Despite the
superficial power imbalances inherent in the pro bono
relationship,100 the fact remains that the machinery of pro bono is
entirely reliant on public interest agencies for access to clients.
The reason for this is quite simple-poor, disadvantaged people do
not call enormous law firms looking for assistance. The lobbies of
the various branch offices of our nations' largest law firms do not
10 Specifically, I am referring to the differential in the amount of human and
capital resources, salaries, and political power at the disposal of the firm, as
opposed to the public interest agency.
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usually teem with migrant workers suffering from poor working
conditions, or with low-income tenants needing assistance with
eviction matters. Instead, as Cummings observes, "[fJor this
collaborative network [the current pro bono system] to succeed, it
is critical that there are organizations external to law firms that
operate to connect firm lawyers with pro bono clients."' 0 '
The pro bono system relies upon the public interest bar, not
just to supply an undifferentiated mass of potential cases, but to
use its expertise to interview and screen such potential clients
before the large firm signs on as counsel or co-counsel. Even
where the firm obtains clients through a pro bono referral agency,
that agency has either received the case through a public interest
agency or its own in-house public interest attorneys have screened
the case for suitability for referral. 102 Because large firm pro bono
programs are, in this way, heavily dependent upon the public
interest bar, public interest attorneys actually have plenty of
leverage in the pro bono transaction. Although public interest
firms certainly cannot force for-profit institutions such as law firms
to align their motivations with something other than pecuniary
gain, they can make some reasonable demands that can help offset
the harmful effects that those motivations can have on participating
public interest programs.
B. Strategically Making Demands to Offset
Harm
To offset the harms caused by the bottom-line motivations
of a firm's pro bono program, a public interest agency can make
specific demands, which will be discussed herein. Specifically, this
Article suggests that: 1) public interest attorneys demand that pro
bono partners assist in the development of needs assessments to
determine the greatest areas of legal need in the community; and
Cummings, Politics,supranote 15, at 42.
See id. at 72 (describing how many large firms are highly reliant on trusted
public interest agencies to screen cases for acceptability, considering some cases
"pre-approved" depending upon the reliability of the source organization).
101

102
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2) in the distribution of pro bono assignments, public interest
attorneys consider explicitly favoring firms who donate money
directly to the agency. There are undoubtedly numerous other
suggestions that could work as well as or better than those set forth
below; public interest attorneys are encouraged to use these
suggestions as an illustrative list, not an exhaustive one.
1. Using a Needs Assessment to Enforce
Triage Boundaries
As noted above, public interest organizations may be
inadvertently harmed when the bottom-line-motivated triage priorities of a pro bono program are allowed to influence the triage
systems of the public interest agency. Clearly, the public interest
agency bears responsibility for ensuring that its own priorities do
not become skewed. But how can this best be accomplished in the
face of pushback from pro bono programs that want certain cases
for reasons having nothing to do with the client population?
In the face of potential triage conflict, public interest
agencies should make better use of legal needs assessments to
create a baseline for the pro bono relationship. A "legal needs
assessment" is a systematized study of a particular target population that is designed to reveal the greatest areas of unmet legal
need. A well-designed, well-executed needs assessment provides
authoritative scaffolding upon which a triage system is built, and
may go a long way toward persuading a pro bono partner that the
needs of the community require a different approach to triage than
that currently favored by the pro bono partner.
Standard 2.1 of The American Bar Association's [ABA]
Standards for the Provision of Civil Legal Aid states that "[a]
provider should interact with low income individuals and groups
serving low income communities to identify compelling legal
needs and should implement plans to address those needs most
effectively."' 0 3 The Comments to that Standard specifically cite
the importance of needs assessments in the process of determining
how best to serve low-income communities, noting that "[m]ore
103 ABA

STANDARDS FOR THE PROVISION OF CIVIL LEGAL AID

§2.1 (2006).
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formal assessments can also establish a baseline regarding the
relative importance attached by individuals in the low income
community to recurring legal problems."1 04
The American Bar Association's Standards for Pro Bono
Programs mirrors the position expressed in the Standards for the
Provision of Civil Legal Aid, explicitly encouraging pro bono
providers to utilize needs assessments to determine program
priorities. The Comments to Standard 2.1 note that "unless legal
needs are identified, a program will have no basis upon which to
determine the types of legal problems it should address." 105 Thus,
on at least a theoretical basis, there exist solid rationales behind
both firms and public interest agencies prioritizing a formalized
assessment of legal needs.
The problem is that needs assessments are not easily
planned or executed. Needs assessments take a great deal of
human and financial capital, and are best designed by social
science researchers who understand survey methodology. This
means that, for all but the largest LSC-funded statewide legal aid
networks, the completion of well-planned, well-executed legal
needs assessments may be out of reach. Without access to a
definitive needs assessment, smaller public interest agencies are
forced to rely on less reliable means of ascertaining client need,
such as using statistics from their existing cases to ascertain the
most pressing legal problems. 1 06 Agencies in this position may
find themselves doing a poor job of enforcing their triage priorities
because the agencies themselves do not have access to an
104

Id. at §2.1 cmt.

ABA STANDARDS FOR PROGRAMS PROVIDING CIVIL PRO BoNo LEGAL
SERVS. TO PERSS. OF LIMITED MEANS §2.1 cmt. (1996) [hereinafter, ABA CIVIL
05

PRO BONo].
106 Although a common metric for discerning legal need, the use
of existing case
data can be a suspect measure of need, since it tends to create a self-perpetuating
cycle. The agency may emphasize outreach to populations with problems that
mirror its existing client population, and then use the resulting case data as
evidence that the legal problems for which it provides services are the most
commonly experienced within the client community.
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authoritative finding on what the needs are of its client population.
Where conviction on this matter is shaky, it is too easy for the legal
director simply to shrug and figure that, in order to get in the good
graces of the pro bono coordinator, it might be okay to dig up a
"sexy" case that the agency has no business taking on, or
prioritizing the needs of a feel-good client over a cranky one, or a
wrinkle-free case over one with some obvious complicating
factors.
I suggest that, where a public interest agency has not
completed a needs assessment due to lack of resources, pro bono
partners be explicitly required to provide funding to perform such
an assessment where one has not been executed. The firm and
public interest agency would then agree to rely upon the findings
of the needs assessment to dictate pro bono priorities. Interestingly, the ABA Standards for Pro Bono Programs currently do not
contemplate such an arrangement, suggesting instead that the pro
bono program could conduct its own needs assessment or rely on
one already executed.10 7
Such an arrangement would help the public interest agency
immeasurably, and would also help the pro bono partner understand, on a less abstract level, what the actual needs of the community are and to have a sense of ownership over the process of
uncovering those needs. The needs assessment would then act as a
fact-finding mechanism, teaching tool, and ultimately as a neutral
arbiter between the triage priorities of the public interest agency
and the pro bono law firm.
All of this, of course, assumes the public interest agency
will have the courage to put the entire collaboration at risk if the
pro bono firm refuses to contribute to the needs assessment (or if
the firm does not honor the neutral findings of a completed needs
assessment). If only certain agencies begin to demand contributions towards needs assessments and strict adherence to their
findings, then it is entirely possible that bottom-line-motivated pro
bono programs will simply forum-shop for a more ethically
flexible pro bono partner who will meet the firm's needs for sexy,
07

ABA CIVIL PRO BONO, supranote 106.
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easy, or noncontroversial cases that provide maximum training
opportunities at minimum cost.
2. Requiring Direct Monetary Contributions
in Exchange for Client Access
Another more controversial strategy of public interest selfprotection is to give preference for the best pro bono assignments
to firms that make significant donations to the public interest
agency in order to offset the overhead costs of recruiting, training
and mentoring the pro bono attorney.
Although some pro bono relationships may cost the public
interest agency very little, others are quite expensive. The starkest
example of such an expensive relationship is the deferred associate
model. 08 In the circumstance of a deferred associate, the associate's salary may be paid by the firm, but, unless the public
interest agency has explicitly bargained for more, the overhead
expenses-which can include employee benefits as well as
infrastructural costs such as office space, computer, licensure fees,
and bar association dues and which may total thousands of
dollars may not be covered. Even where the monetary expenses
are not so evident, subtler effects of the pro bono relationship still
drain resources, particularly time spent by the supervising attorney.
It is true that in many instances the entire purpose of the
pro bono arrangement is to gain access to the resources of the law
firm. And, in truth, the law firm does spend money-sometimes a
great deal of money-on pro bono litigation. But that money is
almost always directed at the costs of litigation in the form of filing
fees, document preparation, expert witness fees, and other
associated costs. And even though some firms donate generously
to the public interest agencies with whom they partner, there is
rarely a formalized or even acknowledged relationship between the
donation and the real cost of the pro bono relationship to the
agency.
'0 See supraSection IV.B.
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Rhode notes that a few public interest agencies have
already moved in the direction of a "pay-to-play" model.10 9 And in
fact, the Pro Bono Institute suggests that it is entirely appropriate
for public interest agencies to request monetary donations to offset
injuries to efficiency.110 These agencies' actions have provoked
some negative reactions from the private bar, which is evident in
the "comments" sections of various legal blogs. (Interestingly,
much of the negative reaction seems to originate from a
fundamental misunderstanding; namely, that the benefit from pro
bono service flows to the agency rather than the client, so the
agency is essentially double-dipping by demanding payment for
supporting the pro bono project.)"'
It may be worthwhile,
Rhode, Midlife, supra note 59, at 2074 (citing Ashby Jones, Law Firms
Willing to Payto Workfor Nothing, WALL ST. J., June 19, 2007).
110 According to a publication of the Pro Bono Institute that seeks to give
guidance to public interest firms seeking pro bono partners, "Pro bono
opportunities, if structured correctly, provide significant benefits to the
volunteer attorney and the firm that employs her or him. Pro bono matters often
offer excellent opportunities for training, skills development, and professional
development, but at a substantial cost for providers who develop training
materials and mentor and supervise pro bono counsel. For providers, of course,
pro bono, though low in cost, is not free, diverting staff and fimancial resources
from other activities. It is entirely appropriate, as a result, that law firms that
have access to strong and well-constructed pro bono programs, be asked to
provide financial support as well as volunteer resources." Leveraging Larger
Firm Resources, PRO BoNo INSTITUTE (1998), http://www.probonoinst.org/pdfs/
leveragingresources.pdf.
...
See above, Comment to Some Law Firms Pay Well to Do Good, WSJ BLOGS:
LAW BLOG, (June 19, 2007, 2:33 PM), http:/blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/
06/19/some-law-firms-pay-well-to-do-good-discuss/tab/comments ("If I'm a
managing partner, I'd say thanks, but no thanks. We believe that the contribution of our time and legal services, for free, is an ample contribution. Sorry you
don't see it similarly."); see also Shameful, Comment to Some Law Firms Pay
Well to Do Good, WSJ BLOGS: LAW BLOG, (June 20, 2007, 4:34 PM),
http:/blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/06/19/some-law-firms-pay-well-to-do-gooddiscuss/tab/comments ("I think this practice is shameful. It is bad enough that
biglaw remains interested in pro bono activity largely as a marketing tool. The
fact that the pro bono organizations are increasingly in this arrangement makes it
worse. These organizations should be happy to get the free help, without
extorting fees."); Anonymous, Comment to Some Law Firms Pay Well to Do
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however, for the public interest bar to weather such criticisms in
the pursuit of appropriate remuneration for the many benefits of
the pro bono relationship that flow directly to the firm.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The relationship between the private bar and public interest
attorneys can be enriching for participants and lifesaving for
clients. For public interest attorneys at small nonprofits with no
real institutionalized training program, interactions with skilled and
ethical pro bono attorneys can provide much-needed professional
mentorship. For under-resourced public interest agencies, pro
bono collaborations can provide a way into cases that would
otherwise utterly overwhelm those offices.
However, positive pro bono collaborations are only really
possible when the pro bono partner is not solely motivated by the
bottom line. The staff of a public interest agency may, at some
point in the agency's life cycle, realize that the agency has
unwittingly partnered with a pro bono program that is designed as
a recruiting tool that will promise far more than it ever intends to
deliver. The agency may find itself enmeshed with a pro bono
program that serves solely as a warehouse for deferred associates
during tough economic times, or a pro bono program that is treated
by the firm solely as a source of "feel-good" stories carefully
crafted to attract clients and project a hollow image of stewardship.
Where public interest lawyers find themselves entangled with such
programs, they must be constantly on the lookout for looming
http:/blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/06/19/some-law-firms-pay-well-to-do-gooddiscuss/tab/ ("This is nuts. I am offering to volunteer extremely valuable time
and on top of that, these so called "public interest" organization[s] want[ ] a
kickback to enable me to provide free service to them. Who are they kidding.
Doesn't sound like they are so needy or deserving if people compete to give
them free services. What a scam. Pro Bono for these orgs is a racket. They will
never get a minute of my time or one penny.").
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injury to triage priorities, case management crises, and erosion of
efficiency. When these problems present themselves, the public
interest lawyers should feel empowered to require that the pro
bono partner take reasonable steps to ensure that the public interest
agency and its attorneys are not harmed in the transaction.

